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Appeals, whereas the appellate civil jurisdiction rests in the Texas
Supreme Court. However, this division is not complete. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals' power to issue writs is limited to issuing
writs of habeas corpus. An original writ of mandamus in a criminal matter must be brought not in the court of criminal appeals, but in the
supreme court. Logically, a petition for a writ of mandamus in a
criminal case should be brought in the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals.
It has been the history of the Texas Legislature to narrow the jurisdiction and authority of the Texas Supreme Court, and reasonably so.
The court should not be encumbered with duties which tend to clog
the administration of their present duties. The best possible way of
placing this burden where it properly belongs is by a constitutional
revision bringing the original writ of mandamus in criminal matters
under the authority of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
John A. Pizzitola
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Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 33 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969).

PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, AND PLACE
ING EFFECT" ON THE RIGHT OF INTERSTATE TRAVEL.

In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Supreme Court consolidated appeals
from three district court cases in which the residence requirements for
welfare assistance were held unconstitutional. The Federal District
Court of Connecticut, in Thompson v. Shapiro,' reversed a ruling of
the Connecticut Welfare Department and held that a welfare claimant
could not be denied assistance solely on the ground that she had not
satisfied the one year residence requirement of the state of Connecticut. In Harrell v. Tobriner,2 the District Court of the District of
1270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967). Decision holding unconstitutional the provisions of
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-2c (1965). Present section 17-2c, formerly classified as § 17-2d,
provides:
When any person comes into this State without visible means of support for the im.

mediate future and applies for aid to dependent children ... within one year from
his arrival, such person shall be eligible only for temporary aid or care until arrangements are made for his return, provided ineligibility for aid to dependent children
shall not continue beyond the maximum federal residence requirement.
2 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967). Residency statute involved (D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203

(1962)) provides in part:
Public assistance shall be awarded to or on behalf of any needy individual who either
(a) has resided in the District for one year immediately preceding the date of filing
his application for such assistance; or (b) who was born within one year immediately
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Columbia held that the denial of welfare benefits to four residents of
the District of Columbia on the grounds that they had not resided in
the District for one year immediately preceding the filing of applications for welfare was a denial of the right to equal protection secured
by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In Smith v. Reynolds,8 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
the denial of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to
two applicants solely on the grounds that they were not residents
of Pennsylvania for one year prior to their application violated the
equal protection clause in that the residence requirement was without
any rational basis or legitimate purpose. In each case, the district court
found that the welfare applicants fulfilled the test for residence in
their respective jurisdictions except for the requirement of residence
for a full year prior to application for aid. The various state agencies
involved appealed to the Supreme Court. Held-Affirmed. Residence
requirements constitute an invidious discrimination denying applicants equal protection of the laws, violate the due process clause of
the fifth amendment, and place a "chilling effect" on the right of
interstate travel.
Residence requirements for welfare recipients are not a new concept. These laws have their antecedents in statutes prevalent centuries
ago in England and the American Colonies. In 1822, Rutland v. Mendon 4 proclaimed there could be no question of the power of the legislature to pass a statute requiring a pauper to reside three years in a
town in order to gain a settlement therein. Over one hundred years
later, the Illinois Supreme Court in a case similar to Rutland ruled
that a three year consecutive residence statute was not such an unreasonable classification as to be unconstitutionally discriminatory. 5 The
view was taken that there was no common law obligation on the state
or any local governmental unit to support paupers. The state, through
humanitarian attributes, may voluntarily assume the support of the
needy citizens.6 Consequently, the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme
Court was that the state should have a large degree of discretion when
7
it elects to furnish relief.
preceding the application for such aid, if the parent or other relative with whom the
child is living has resided in the District for one year immediately preceding the
birth . ...
8 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Decision holding unconstitutional the provisions of
PA. STAT., tit.
62 § 432(6) (1967) that provides in part:
Assistance may be granted only to or in behalf of a person residing in Pennsylvania
who (i) has resided therein for at least one year immediately preceding the date of
application . . ..
4 1 Pick (Mass.) 154 (1822).
5 People v. Lyons, 30 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1940).
6Id.
7 Id.
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More recently, several suits have been brought in federal district
courts concerning residence requirements and their application to welfare programs. The courts have been divided in their decisions and
there has been no clear-cut majority on the issue of constitutionality.
In Harrell v. Board of Commissioners of District of Columbia,8 a
case decided in 1967, the court concluded that no substantial constitutional question was raised by the contention that a one year residence requirement for public welfare was unconstitutional. State legislatures are endowed with a wide range of discretion in enacting laws
that affect some of its residents differently than others. 9 A statutory discrimination is not to be declared unconstitutional if any state of facts
may reasonably justify it.i0

Nonetheless, other district courts have found similar state residence
statutes in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment"- and have held that such statutes impede indigents in
their right to travel and serve no legitimate purpose. 12 Green v. Department of Public Welfare of State of Delaware8 found a one year
residence prerequisite unconstitutional stating that it created an invidious discrimination. In these cases the courts were unable to find
any "reasonable" purpose that the statutes served.
One court went so far as to state that even if it were assumed that
some people moved in order to enjoy a greener welfare pasture and
that a state may properly deny aid to persons who come with that
intent, a one year residence requirement for state aid was not reasonable since it would have the effect of conclusively presuming that
all people who need aid within a year have come to the state for that
14
purpose.
The only Texas authority concerning welfare requirements is an
opinion of the Attorney General in which it was stated that the residence requirement must be fulfilled "no matter what reason for absence
or intention to return."' 5
The issue of residence requirements was presented to the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Shapiro case. The Court relied on
8 269 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1967); see Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967)
involving same situation.

9 Waggoner v. Rosenn, 286 F. Supp. 275 (M.D. Pa. 1968). Using this premise and stating
reasonableness of the provision, the court found the Pennsylvania residency statute constitutional.
10 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 57 S. Ct. 904, 81 L. Ed. 1307 (1937); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369 (1911).

11 Johnson v. Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 1165 (N.D. Ill., E.D. 1967).
12 Robertson v. Ott, 284 F. Supp. 735 (D. Mass. 1968).

'3 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967).
14 Ramos v. Health and Social Services Bd. of State of Wis., 276 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Wis.
1967).
15 Tx. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. 07064 (1946).
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the landmark freedom of travel cases16 to assert that if "a law has no
other purpose than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by
penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it is patently
unconstitutional."' 7 The observation was made that none of the statutes before the Court would discourage indigents who would enter the
state solely to obtain larger benefits.' 8 The statutes were held to create
an irrebuttable presumption that every applicant for assistance in his

first year of residence would come to the jurisdiction solely to obtain

higher benefits.' 9 "More fundamentally," the Court stated, "a State
may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare
20
benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally."
To the argument advanced by the appellants that the classification
attempts to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of
contribution they have made to the community through the payment
of taxes, the Court answered that they found it difficult to visualize
how long-term residents who qualify for welfare could make a greater

present contribution to the state in taxes than indigent residents who

have recently arrived. 2' To further substantiate their position, the
majority concluded that the reasoning of the appellants would logically permit the states to bar new residents from schools, parks, and
libraries. 22 The Supreme Court ruled that the objectives advanced

for the reason to have the waiting period were in reality nonexistent in
that the waiting period requirement neither facilitated budgeting nor
23
served as an administrative rule of thumb for determining residence.
Appellants (Connecticut and Pennsylvania) argued that the con-

stitutional challenge to the waiting period requirement must fail
24
because section 402(b) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended,
expressly approves the imposition of residence requirements. The
16 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1966); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S. Ct.
1113, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (1958); Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160, 62
S. Ct. 164, 86 L. Ed. 119 (1941); and Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 12 L. Ed. 702
(1849).
17 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at-,
89 S. Ct. at 1330, 22 L. Ed. 2d at 613.
21 Id. at ,89 S. Ct. at 1330, 22 L. Ed. 2d at 614.
22 Id.
23 Id. at
,89 S. Ct. at 1331, 22 L. Ed. 2d at 615.
24 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(b) (1965). Section 602(b) referred to provides that the
Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified . . . except
that he shall not approve any plan which imposes as a condition of eligibility for aid to
families with dependent children, a residence requirement which denies aid with
respect to any child residing in the State (1) who has resided in the State for one year
: I . or (2) who was born within one year immediately preceding the application,
if the parent or other relative with whom the child is living has resided in the State
for one year immediately preceding the birth.
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majority viewed this statute as not approving or prescribing a one
which have requireyear requirement, but merely disapproving plans
25
standards.
federal
the
ments that do not meet
In the final analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that since the
classification touches on a fundamental right of interstate movement
and since no compelling state interest was proven, the statutes violated the equal protection clause. 26 It should be noted, however, that
the Court expressly stated they did not imply a view of the validity of
a waiting period or residence requirement for determining eligibility
to vote, for tuition-free education, to obtain a license, to practice a
profession, to hunt, to fish, 7 or to do other activities that require a
2
minimum residence period.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, with whom Mr. Justice Black joined,
dissented from the majority opinion. The dissent argued that residence requirements were thoroughly discussed in congressional hearings on the Social Security Act.28 The dissent also contended that the
freedom of travel cases were inapplicable on the ground that residence
requirements "do not create a flat prohibition for potential welfare
recipients may move from State to State and establish residence.
wherever they please. Nor is any claim made by appellees that resibetween the right to
dence requirements compel them to choose
' 29
travel and another constitutional right.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren rather adamantly attacks the views and
holdings of the majority:
Today's decision, it seems to me, reflects to an unusual degree
the current notion that this Court possesses a peculiar wisdom all
its own whose capacity to lead this Nation out of its present
troubles is contained only by the limits of judicial ingenuity in
contriving new constitutional principles to meet each problem
as it arises. For anyone who, like myself, believes that it is an
essential function of this Court to maintain the constitutional
divisions between state and federal authority and among the three
branches of the Federal Government, today's decision is a step
in the wrong direction.30
The Shapiro decision relied heavily on freedom of travel, but do the
freedom of travel cases actually have any credence in the Shapiro
situation? No argument is taken with the fact that the right to travel
25

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (969)..

26 Id.
27 id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at-,

89 S. Ct. at 1354, 22 L. Ed. 2d at 640.
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is a right that the Constitution guarantees and that it is constitutionally protected independent of the fourteenth amendment.8 ' The landmark freedom of travel cases found unconstitutional a statute or
prohibition that limited passports to communists who attempted to
go abroad,8 2 which made it a felony for a member of a communist
organization to apply for a passport,33 or which made the bringing of
an indigent nonresident into a state a misdemeanor.3 4 However, the
Supreme Court does acknowledge that the right to travel may be
limited. 5
Edwards v. People of State of California38 closely characterizes the
Shapiro case. Edwards held that a California statute making it a misdemeanor to bring or to assist in bringing into the state any indigent
nonresident was not a valid exercise of the state's "police power" and
was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.8 7 It should be
noted that the Court in Edwards stated, "We are not now called upon
to determine anything other than the propriety of an attempt by a
State to prohibit the transportation of indigent non-residents into its
territory. The nature and extent '38of its obligation to afford relief to
newcomers is not here involved.
In an analysis of these freedom of travel cases, we find that the
statute or provision was a direct barrier upon a person's right to travel.
In Shapiro, if there is a barrier, it is merely an indirect requirement
to receive welfare once a party is within the state. A party is free to
move into a state with a residence requirement.
Shapiro called attention to the "chilling effect" on freedom of travel.
This statement presupposes that the residence requirement not only
intended to have, but that it did have, an effect on the right to travel.
The suggestion that the residence requirement interferes with the
8 39
freedom of travel has been called "far-fetched" and "remote.
It is a misconception to state that large numbers of indigents are
on the move in search of a more favorable welfare climate. It has been
shown that indigents are influenced by climate, employment, and
educational opportunities. 40 Welfare aid was found not to be a lure for
people on the move, and there is high migration into states where
31 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1966).
82 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S. Ct. 1113, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (1958).
88 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1964).
34 Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S. Ct. 164, 86 L. Ed. 119
(1941).
85 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1966).
86 314 U.S. 160, 62 S. Ct. 164, 86 L. Ed. 119 (1941).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 174, 62 S. Ct. at 167, 86 L. Ed. at 126.
89 Harrell v. The Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 269 F. Supp. 919
(D.D.C. 1967); Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967).
40 Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes-I,51 IA. L. REV. 1080 (1966).
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living is attractive irrespective of strict residence requirements.4 1 It

seems difficult to argue that residence requirements obstruct the right
to travel when studies show there is little if any consideration placed
upon them by people as they move from state to state.
In what direction are we proceeding? First, we are dealing with
welfare; then, we apply at most an indirect restriction on the freedom
of travel to determine that the restriction is unconstitutional. By this
logical progression, how can residence requirements for such a basic
right as voting be upheld? Is not the Court concerning itself with the
wisdom and soundness of the statutes? Is it not also true that the wisdom or lack of wisdom, soundness or unsoundness of legislative judgment are irrelevant considerations in determining the issue of con42
stitutionality?
The Social Security Act of 1935 marked the beginning of federal
subsidization of state programs for aid to dependent children, the
43
aged, the blind, and the disabled. Under 42 U.S.C.A. sec. 602(b) (1)
the states must submit acceptable plans to the administration to qualify
for funds, and the section specifically states that the administration will
not accept any plan that requires residence of more than one year.
This can only mean that the Congress, after all the hearings before
the enactment of the Social Security Act, approved a one year requirement but not a longer one. The majority in Shapiro refused to declare
this section unconstitutional but circumvented the argument by stating that the section does not allow residence requirements but merely
states that it will reject any plan with longer requirements than one
year. 4 This does not mean white is black, but it surely makes white a
very dark grey. The section can be viewed only as an express authorization to the states to impose residence requirements not exceeding one
year according to the stipulations in the section. The logical conclusion of ruling these residence requirements unconstitutional would
be to rule the section of the Social Security Act unconstitutional, but
the Court in Helvering v. Davis45 upheld the Act.
The impact of Shapiro was bound to have its effect. Morrison v.
Vincent,4 6 decided less than two months after Shapiro, held a West

Virginia statute unconstitutional. It is difficult to overlook the reluctance and regret of the district court in fulfilling its obligation.4 7 Board
41 Kasius, What Happens in a State Without Residence Requirements, in Residence
Laws-Roads Block to Human Welfare, 18, 19 (National Traveler's Aid Ass'n 1956).
42 Waggoner v. Rosenn, 286 F. Supp. 275 (M.D. Pa. 1968).
43 See note 24.
44 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969).
45 301 U.S. 619, 57 S. Ct. 904, 81 L. Ed. 1307 (1937).
46 300 F. Supp. 541 (S.D. West Va. 1969).
47 Id. at 544: ,
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